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THESIS

**STRATEGIES TO BUILD A TRUSTED AND
COLLABORATIVE INFORMATION
SHARING SYSTEM FOR STATE-LEVEL
HOMELAND SECURITY**

by

Robert L. Flowers

June 2004

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Paul Stockton
Chris Bellavita

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**STRATEGIES TO BUILD A TRUSTED AND COLLABORATIVE
INFORMATION SHARING AND HOMELAND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
IN UTAH**

Robert L. Flowers
Commissioner of Public Safety
State of Utah
B.S., University of Utah, 1986

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June 2004**

Author: Robert L. Flowers

Approved by: Paul Stockton, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor: Paul Stockton, Ph.D.

Christopher Bellavita, Ph.D.
Second Reader/Co-Advisor:

Jim Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INFORMATION SHARING IN UTAH	1
A.	FROM NATIONAL STRATEGY TO EFFECTIVE STATE-LEVEL CHANGE	2
II.	CHALLENGES TO THE INFORMATION PROCESS	5
III.	OVERCOMING CULTURAL BARRIERS TO CHANGE	21
IV.	RECOMMENDED ACTIONS	29
V.	CONCLUSION	45
	BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND SOURCES CITED	47
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	51

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Levels of Leadership.....	30
Figure 2.	Restraining and Driving Forces Model for Level II	36
Figure 3.	Level II Leadership.....	37
Figure 4.	Restraining and Driving Forces of UOPSC	39

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Strategies to Build a
Trusted and Collaborative
Information Sharing and
Homeland Security Environment
In Utah

Robert L. Flowers
Thesis

June 2004

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I. INFORMATION SHARING IN UTAH

At all levels of government, strategies to prevent terrorism will rely on the development and distribution of actionable information. It is essential that the United States strengthen its capacity to gather, share, analyze and disseminate information. In the State of Utah, however, these efforts have been jeopardized by a failure to adequately understand the cultural impediments to building more effective information systems. Spending more money on “stuff” (hardware, communications systems, etc.) will not provide for better information sharing, unless cultural barriers to change are recognized and taken into account in State planning.

Public safety officers in Utah are, in my experience, extremely dedicated and competent public servants. Nevertheless, three cultural characteristics of the public safety community pose significant problems for efforts to improve the gathering and flow of homeland security-related information challenges for information initiatives in Utah. First, even when seemingly reasonable changes are made in the way that information is supposed to be gathered and distributed, the lack of trust between the people in that redesigned system will sabotage its actual effectiveness. Second, people in the information system are often subject to “groupthink;” that is, they lose their ability for independent thought and judgment, and instead follow the herd in resisting efforts for change. Third, officials are prone to parochialism. They view problems from a narrow, local perspective, rather from the bigger picture of State and national requirements for homeland security.

This thesis analyzes how cultural barriers have impeded recent efforts to involve local police and sheriffs departments in informational sharing initiative. My findings are typified by the response offered by an elected Sheriff to efforts at involving his department in an informational sharing database: “Stay out of my county and take the database with you.”¹ Another sheriff noted that “I don’t trust the State or the FBI for that

¹ Sheriff Rick Hawkins of Uintah County, Utah. Interviewed by R. Flowers. Discussion on Investigations. October, 2003.

matter.”² These statements are representative of the attitudes, values and cultural biases that my research found to be common among Utah’s public safety leaders.

The culture within these public safety agencies has become a part of the fabric of Utah; it has long been ignored, and even accepted. By not acknowledging this negative environment, and not creating a strategy to deal with it, efforts to the necessary collaborative information system in Utah have been undermined. There has been some slow improvement in that system, but the urgency and measurable progress necessary in this effort does not exist.

The top priority in Utah should be the building of a new culture where trust and collaboration exist among the organizations involved in homeland security. This thesis argues that such collaboration does not exist today, and will not grow naturally on its own. Further, states such as Utah need to develop and implement a strategic plan to build a culture of collaboration. If we fail to do so, we may end up spending enormous amounts of money with little positive impact. The 30 million dollars that has been spent in Utah thus far (with millions more coming) for purchasing technology, equipping first responders, and creating complex plans has not begun to address the historical cultural characteristics that will undermine the entire effectiveness of this effort.

A. FROM NATIONAL STRATEGY TO EFFECTIVE STATE-LEVEL CHANGE

The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines that strategy as an effort to mobilize and organize our nation to secure the United States homeland from terrorist attacks. The report went on to state that, “This is an exceedingly complex mission that requires coordinated and focused effort from our entire society – the federal government, state and local governments, the private sector and the American people.”³ The key words here are coordinated and focused. Both characteristics have been ignored in Utah thus far in the information management area. In Utah, the goal of those involved in homeland security is to protect the citizens and interests of the state, the region, and the

² Sheriff Lamont Smith of Kane County, Utah. Discussion during Sheriffs’ meeting with R. Flowers. May, 2003.

³ Office of Homeland Security. “National Strategy for Homeland Security.” Washington, D.C., July 2002

Nation from injury, loss, and disruption and damage resulting from terrorist or criminal acts.⁴ This is accomplished through the elimination or reduction of vulnerability to such acts, the effective management of risks associated with such acts, and the early detection and proper response to those who threaten such acts. Achieving this goal will require the gathering and sharing of preventive information that can only be provided in an environment of trust and collaboration. What has become clear is that structural and cultural changes will be required in Utah, especially in the informational sharing area. To attempt to introduce new technologies for information gathering and sharing without a strategy to build support and trust will not be successful.

This thesis examines the MATRIX (Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange) program in Utah as a case study to analyze how cultural bias against sharing information can impede efforts at needed change. Despite the strong support of MATRIX by the Department of Homeland Security, and that fact that – at least in theory – the system’s information-sharing capabilities offered significant improvements, Utah rejected the program. According to interviews I conducted with elected leaders (who wanted to remain unnamed) the program itself was not the key problem. Rather, MARTRIX became politically unacceptable because of the lack of trust in Utah of the national government, and the way the MATRIX program was introduced and “marketed.” Utah rejected a potentially effective tool because of a culture of distrust of government, because and no strategy was adopted to sell the program in a way that would overcome existing cultural biases. This omission was a critical misjudgment by those responsible for implementing the program.

MATRIX exemplifies the broader challenge confronting information initiatives in Utah. One cannot just hope that a conducive environment for sharing will evolve. Impediments to change must be identified and solutions found. To accomplish both objectives, I will used interviews, meeting discussions, and a survey to Chiefs and Sheriffs in to understand the nature of the impediments we confront, and derive strategies to overcome them. I will also examine case studies such as MATRIX where failed efforts offer lessons that can be learned for the future. Based on the specific restraining

⁴ Utah Homeland Security Vision. Prepared by the Department of Public Safety, State of Utah. 2002.

forces or impediments to information flow I identify, and an analysis of the academic literature on the nature of cultural impediments to change, I offer recommendations on how Utah can best move forward in the information realm. These recommendations identify specific actionable steps that States like Utah can take to build the culture of collaboration needed to facilitate information sharing.

The literature in the field indicates that cultural change is only possible if strong leadership helps drive that process. A key finding of my thesis is that in Utah, the lack of such leadership (until recently) has contributed to the lack of collaboration, urgency, and allocation of resources towards building the effective collaboration required for information sharing. The Governor of Utah must drive this effort, which will also require committed and aggressive leadership at all levels of government. Those leaders will create the vision and develop the strategy appropriate for their level. The driving factors for leadership will be the dollars, law, and mutual benefit. The strategy will include identification of restraining and driving forces in homeland security concepts. The strategy will also identify actions that either support or remove the restraining or driving forces. Recommendations will also be made to create the necessary change environment required to address those powerful cultural characteristics thriving in Utah today. A recommendation to build a curriculum for first line responders will be made. Until recently, training and education did not exist in Utah for homeland security. A new program to meet this need has been developed by the Department of Public Safety with Utah State University in Logan, Utah and will be required by the Utah Peace Officer's Standards and Training during the in-service period of training for first responders. Such training and education programs are critical for building the trust and collaborative culture needed to promote genuine information sharing.

II. CHALLENGES TO THE INFORMATION PROCESS

Information sharing has become the lifeblood of homeland security. Without information, prevention is impossible. Vision, strategy and actions are all guided by actionable information. Actionable information must be the guiding factor in vulnerability and risk assessments. By not using accurate /actionable information to drive current planning, the spending of millions of dollars is inefficient at best and meaningless at worst. The Utah strategy should be driven by meaningful risk analysis and vulnerability evaluations. These two efforts are guided by information provided at all levels of government inside and outside Utah. This information is not being gathered effectively, shared efficiently, and disseminated meaningfully. The main obstacles have been identified as cultural rather than financial.

In Utah several efforts have been made to enhance the information sharing process for many years prior to the September 11th event. Those efforts have had mixed success. A review of the informational environment prior to September 11th would indicate little commitment at any level, no real support in resources, and certainly no strategy to improve the ability to share information. An evaluation of the post-September 11 environment indicates little improvement other than the buying of equipment. The purchasing of equipment has been fast and furious and based on opinion and want rather than specific risks and threats to the citizens in Utah. There is little agreement on the threats or risks. The significant disagreement between disciplines such as fire and police is evidence of this. The information processes continue to be fractured and stovepiped between all levels. Significant effort has been made to create the infrastructure and there has been much improvement between the federal and state levels. However, significant improvement is still needed at the local and county levels. This informational infrastructure just does not exist in Utah to the extent needed. There has been significant effort to improve, but these efforts have failed because the strategy did not include the cultural issues embedded in Utah, cultural issues that have a long history.

Historically in Utah, the information sharing environment has been nonexistent. The need was simply not seen as necessary beyond routine investigations. Utah created ULEIN (Utah Law Enforcement Information Network) many years ago and last year had

less than 100 inquiries.⁵ When asked why it was not used more often, Val Shupe, President of the Utah Chief's Association stated, "We (the Chief's) have our own systems and don't need the state's." When asked what that was, he replied, "the phone."⁶ He further stated that the ULEIN system creators never asked anyone about the necessity of such a system or made the users part of the design or decision making process; thus, no buy-in and no sense of need. Getting the buy-in of the customer does require an inclusive strategy. The national goal and state goal are noble and are explained in this paper, but without the buy-in of the leaders, they are only noble words on paper with little action. Thus the strategy must be drafted with the thought of creating a sense of importance and urgency in order to create the buy-in of the leaders.

In the Markle Report historical and cultural features are discussed. The report concludes that historical and cultural features interact to shape the response or resistance to homeland security. Further, these features, according to the report, may move organizations towards or away from an inter-operable, interconnected national homeland security effort.⁷ It is clear through meetings, interviews, and a survey that in Utah cultural features, both driving and restraining, exist. The Markle report further reads that the historical and cultural environments have evolved and are shaped by adverse political, economic and social interactions that include a history of conflict, distrust, jealousy, and even an environment where groups have formed a common cause. This is evident in Utah and will be described in the context of groupthink.

In October of 2002 the Oquirrh Institute held a review of the 2002 Olympic security effort. Sixty participants from the private sector and from the local, state, and federal public safety community attended the conference. They identified several principles from the Olympics that can be applied to homeland security. Some of these principles include:

⁵ ULEIN (Utah Law Enforcement Information Network) inquiries provided by Capt. Mitch McKee, Utah Criminal Information Center, Utah Department of Public Safety. 2003

⁶ Chief Val Shupe of South Ogden Police Department. President of Utah Chief's Association. Interviewed by author. 2004

⁷ Markle Foundation Task Force. "Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security. Second Report. New York City, NY. December 2003. Page 78

1. Build social capital - the Mortar
2. Rely on networks - not on a mainframe
3. Integrate homeland security into all public safety activity
4. Make haste - but with deliberation

Without a strategy to develop the above-listed principles, the homeland security strategy is without focus. The Oquirrh Institute study pointed out the importance of structure and relationships. According to the study, social capital was of primary importance. Social capital is a shorthand way of thinking about relationships. Again, this illustrates the point that government at all levels can build structures and provide equipment, but relationships will hold things together. These lessons are extremely important to the homeland security effort in Utah.

I have identified three aspects of human behavior that will require thought and strategy development. I found these three to be mentioned more often and demonstrated in behaviors throughout the state of Utah. These three particularly strong characteristics embedded in the cultures in Utah are parochialism, groupthink, and the lack of trust. They have generally been identified as restraining forces to the Homeland Security effort. As these characteristics are evaluated, a strategy at all levels of government must be developed. Restraining and driving forces beyond these three have also been identified through interviews, group discussion, experiences, and a survey of Utah law enforcement leadership, but the three most powerful are lack of trust, groupthink and parochialism.

We begin with a discussion on what the culture is in Utah and how culture shapes the local, state and national effort concerning homeland security in Utah. According to author Edgar Schein, "Culture, is a pattern of shared assumptions that a group has learned, a way to think, perceive, feel and eventually act."⁸ As an example, Utah has a long history of antigovernment sentiment. Utah was founded by a group of people who were persecuted by government. This fact is repeated often and contributes to the lack of trust in government. Rural Utah has a strong history of individuality and self-reliance: "The western mentality" is a phrase often used in Utah. This western mentality usually describes individuals or groups that are strongly independent, want to be left alone, and need little governance. The rural geography of Utah has made it necessary that

⁸ Schein, Edgar H. "Organizational Culture and Leadership." Second Edition. Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, California, 1997. Page 12

governmental agencies build “stand alone” systems through local agencies and not rely on state or federal assistance. These shared assumptions and a long history of independence have evolved into a “we can do it ourselves” attitude. This independence has developed into system protectionism and jealous ownership. Any suggested change recommended by other government agencies is taken personally. An example of these characteristics is provided in investigations by the state, initiated investigations that lead into a rural county in Utah. The Utah State Division of Driver’s License was investigating fraud inside the Driver’s License office. The investigation led to a suspect in a rural county in Utah where an arrest was made at 7:30 a.m. on December 5, 2003.⁹ State officers went to the residence and made the arrest. The Sheriff’s Office was notified at 7:15 a.m. of the impending arrests, fifteen minutes prior to the arrest. The Sheriff was extremely angry and called the Commissioner of Public Safety threatening him and his officers with arrest if “they came into his county again without prior approval”.¹⁰ Later, at a strategy meeting, this event was discussed, and it was concluded that the Sheriff was justified in his concern, (however, it was also stated that his anger was unacceptable).¹¹ During that meeting, a strategy was suggested to avoid this type of incident in the future. Much can be learned from this seemingly unimportant rural Utah event. As childish as this may sound, this event is an effective example of the environment in rural Utah and further evidence of the need for strategies to be developed to deal with the cultures of distrust between agencies. As another rural Sheriff said, “This stuff wasn’t built overnight and it will not go away with just words and good intentions.”¹² This is an effective example of embedded culture, which will take time to change. But that time must bring positive experiences and collaboration, or nothing will change.

Lessons must also be learned from another state investigation involving a small rural county, . The Utah Department of Public Safety often sends investigators to check compliance of the alcohol laws by commercial entities such as bars, clubs, and

⁹ Driver License Arrest. DPS Case #2003-00035. Vernal, Utah. December 5, 2003.

¹⁰ Sheriff Rick Hawkins of Uintah County Sheriff’s Office. Phone Call to the Commissioner of Public Safety. 2004

¹¹ Meeting at Utah Department of Public Safety Headquarters over Driver License issues. 2004

¹² Sheriff Edgar Phillips of Millard County, Utah. Interview by author. February, 2004

restaurants. The investigators were detailed to a rural county and, after a time, several summons were issued to a number of local businesses. The reaction to this enforcement by the elected sheriff was quick.

The Sheriff received several complaints from local businesses, including a County Commissioner. The Commissioner was evidently very vocal with the Sheriff about the state coming into town without some warning (an example of western mentality). The state investigators did not advise the elected Sheriff they were coming into the community of 15,000. This oversight left the Sheriff with the sense that he was not trusted or considered important enough to be involved.¹³ The Sheriff asked the Commissioner of Public Safety if the reason he was not told was a matter of trust It wasn't; it was simply an oversight. This simple oversight had dramatic effects on the relationship between local law enforcement and the state. The negative feelings continue to this day. This case is four years old and still reverberates in this small community and is talked about among a small powerful group in this area. Incidents of this nature are not uncommon and evolve into restraining forces to building an effective homeland security environment. Actions of this nature only serve to enforce the negative restraining forces of distrust, parochialism, and groupthink. This is an example of historical environments evolving and being shaped by adverse interactions. In this county there is a history of conflict, distrust, and jealousy, as the Markle Report described.

The biggest obstacle to implementing the best-designed system in the world is often culture, and unless fundamental changes occur in the culture, progress is stymied. Culture in Utah must undergo a fundamental change. The Markle Report emphasized that no vehicle will lead to change unless the leader at the top is completely clear about the objects he or she seeks. Leadership is key. In order to have an effective homeland security environment in Utah, the major challenges may not be creating physical infrastructures, but the cultural barriers and leadership challenges. Parochialism has been identified as one of those cultural restraining barriers that must be strategized. Parochialism in leadership is alive and thriving in Utah.

¹³ Sheriff Lamar Guymon of Emery County Sheriff's Office. Confidential discussion with the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. 2004

Stephen Robbins discusses in his book *Essentials of Organizational Behavior* cultural barriers that effect change. One of the major challenges is parochialism.¹⁴ An example of parochialism in Utah is information sharing among geographically adjoining agencies. Historically, Utah agencies (especially public safety agencies) do not routinely share information. Rather, they protect their information. The current environment in Utah is evidence of this historical stovepiped approach developed from parochial approaches caused by the independence. This stovepiped information was generally limited and protected by the originating organization for confidentiality reasons. Information generally concerned criminal investigations within the jurisdictions without any thought to gathering, sharing, and analysis of information to share on a national level. The leaders in these organizations believed they had the best systems and were not interested in changing them. Reasons ranged from cost to no sense of need to even apathy. The new environment now required brings new sharing challenges. The challenge has been made more difficult with the stovepiped systems that have been created by independent organizations. No planning included sharing. An example exists in Washington County, Utah.

The St. George Police Department, which is located in Washington County, created an informational management system that only focused on the needs of the city. Washington County Sheriff's Department did the same. The result was a geographic area with shared law enforcement challenges but without informational systems that could routinely share information. This is an example of parochialism, as Robbins described.¹⁵ Any information sharing had to be done with meetings, specific database searches, or old fashion phone calls. This environment evolved over time and is an example of the information infrastructure in Utah. Those reasons ranged from shortsightedness to system protection to lack of trust to simply not understanding the future needs of sharing. The most significant impacting characteristic of this environment was the lack of leadership, trust, and planning. The leaders developed their system based on historical parochialism and with no thought of needing to share with other agencies.

¹⁴ Robbins, Stephen P., "Essentials of Organizational Behavior." Third Edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1992. Page 13

¹⁵ Robbins, Stephen P., "Essentials of Organizational Behavior." Third Edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1992. Page 13

Parochialism is not unique to government agencies. In discussing the challenges of business managers in a global economy, Robbins writes, “A global economy presents challenges to managers that they never had to confront when their operations were constrained within national borders.”¹⁶ According to Robbins, business leaders view the world solely through their own eyes and perspective. People with a parochial perspective do not recognize that other people have different ways of living and working. Those in Washington County acted much like business leaders dealing with a global economy. Further, Robbins indicates that to add insult to injury, Americans also frequently believe their cultural values and customs are superior to others. This characteristic is alive and well in public safety organizations in Utah. Different communication systems and record keeping systems are once again indicators of parochial decisionmaking. This problem is compounded with unwillingness to even entertain that a different approach may be more effective. An example of this is the UCAN (Utah Communications Agency Network) Project in Utah. The Sheriff of Salt Lake County continually refused to join a communication network with shared resources simply because he wants his own system. This is even after MOUs (Memorandums of Understanding) were signed and an expansion to the Center was made at the cost of several hundred thousand dollars. His statement was, “No one is going to tell me how to run my communication center. Further, we have a better system and we are going to keep it.”¹⁷ Salt Lake County Commissioners had to finally get involved and compelled the Sheriff to finally join the UCAN Project.

A governmental agency can spend hundreds of millions of dollars on an informational infrastructure to gather, share, or analyze information, but without the buy-in of those who will provide that necessary support, the results can be an inefficient, ineffective, and insignificant infrastructure. Howard Aldrich in his book *Organizations Evolving* describes the importance of leadership in this process. He writes, “We emphasize, however, that no vehicle will lead to change unless the leader at the top is

¹⁶ Robbins, Stephen P., “Essentials of Organizational Behavior.” Third Edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 1992. Page 13

¹⁷ Sheriff Aaron Kennard of Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Office stated this in a LEED’s (Law Enforcement Executive Directors) meeting at the Sandy Police Department. 2003

completely clear about the objects he or she seeks.”¹⁸ If leadership is so critical, then parochial leadership could be fatal to these efforts. An examination of the challenge demonstrated the importance of individual public safety leaders’ beliefs concerning providing information and supporting other governmental agencies. He writes that it is the elite of an organization who make the decisions leading to organizational change.¹⁹ On the flip side, Utah history is characterized by the elite resisting organizational change. A cursory examination of Utah reveals the importance of a critical analysis of the behaviors of parochial leaders and their influence on organizational behaviors affecting the informational processes. Parochial leaders can have dramatic effects on groups under other leaders also. This influence can lead to groupthink, which generally has developed into resistance to anything led by the state, other than the giving out of dollars.

Groupthink is just as the name indicates, a group of people who have joined together for whatever reason. They develop a common goal, common thoughts, or common actions. Groupthink is alive and well in all parts of Utah. Groupthink has generally been a restraining force in building a collaborative informational/homeland security environment. Dr. Jim Breckenridge of Stanford University spoke on the subject of groupthink at the Naval Postgraduate School in a class on fear management. He stated that groupthink is a real threat to people fighting terrorism. Some characteristics of groupthink, according to Dr. Breckenridge, include:

1. A big press for consensus
2. People getting comfortable in groups and becoming easy to lead
3. Small elite groups causing real damage to the overall strategy of the group
4. Shutting oneself off from alternative thoughts and idea
5. Normal groups often make bad mistakes by being influenced by groupthink

In Utah numerous groups exist who demonstrate these characteristics in such a fashion that could prove to be critical restraining forces in homeland security. Influential members of the Utah Sheriffs’ Association demonstrate the characteristics of small elite groups, causing real damage to homeland security efforts in Utah. These few influential members often take a combative stance against the state, even when the actions taken are

¹⁸ Aldrich, Howard E. “Organizations Evolving.” Sage Publications, London, 2000.

¹⁹ Aldrich, Howard E. “Organizations Evolving.” Sage Publications, London, 2000.

to their mutual benefit. These individuals press for consensus when it is not in the best interest of the association. As a result of this, there has been strong division in the Sheriff's Association organization. This is evident by many of their own members speaking to the Commissioner of Public Safety after meetings and expressing their positions of support. They simply do not want to voice their opinions publicly or in the group for fear of criticism from the group.

According to an article in *Psychology Today*, groupthink symptoms are displayed in many ways.²⁰ Powerful social pressures brought to bear by the members of a cohesive group whenever a dissident voices his objection to a group consensus. Examples of this in Utah are as recent as a few months ago and involve issues such as a state sponsored dive/rescue team, creation of an investigative unit, and the use of special enforcement teams. The need for a dive team was identified by those forming homeland security at the state level as appropriate for such activities as security checks of waterways and dams. The team was formed and trained. Dissension was immediate among state sheriffs concerned that the state was impeding upon their mission and may be competing for their resources. A decision was made by a group of sheriffs not to call the state team for any support, hoping the state would be forced to abandon this effort for lack of a mission. One sheriff who contacted the team for help in finding a drowning victim voiced his support of the team in an open meeting and was immediately attacked by the other sheriffs in the room for not supporting their position. The issue then became so divisive and concurrence-seeking became so dominant that it overrode a realistic appraisal of the team, which in the end was determined to be a positive thing for the sheriff's departments. This type of behavior became so common in the Sheriffs' Association meeting that the Commissioner of Public Safety started attending the meetings to defend the state's position on certain issues. Another key characteristic of groupthink evident in the example above is the norm of remaining loyal to the group by sticking with the policies to which the group has already committed itself, even when those policies are obviously working out badly and have unintended consequences that disturb the conscience of each member.²¹ The Commissioner received several phone calls from

²⁰ Psychology Today – November 1971, NPS Curriculum

²¹ Psychology Today – November 1971, NPS Curriculum

other sheriffs who were disturbed by the meetings and did not support the group's position. They just felt that to speak up would only bring further dissension to the group. As one sheriff put it, "I will do what I need to do regardless of the group's decision. I will not have a family standing on the shore waiting for us to find their loved one's body when I am out of divers, knowing full well that a team is available."²²

According to Dr. Breckenridge, the one important strategy to combating this type of groupthink is putting in place strong leadership. The breakdown of groupthink has to start at the top. It must be part of the Department of Public Safety's strategy to be more aggressive in working with the leadership of the Utah Chiefs' and Sheriffs' Associations in combating these small elite groups. Historically, there has not been substantial effort in this area. Recently the Commissioner of Public Safety has spent much time communicating with the leaders of these groups, and the results of these efforts have been positive. The environment now is more collaborative, communication is more effective, and trust seems to be evolving. As Dr. Breckenridge said, "This type of influence is a real danger to people fighting terrorism in Utah."²³

Examples of groupthink have the five symptoms that are important to identify when looking to build a strategy. Those five symptoms are invulnerability, rationale, morality, stereotyping and applying pressure.²⁴ Examples of these in Utah are well documented. The illusion of invulnerability provides some degree of over optimism such as the taking down of federal road signs on federal property by county officials, including the sheriff. The rural environment does give a sense of invulnerability when the state or federal officials rarely appear at meetings or only discuss issues through letters. The associations often take the position that their group position is always right and they become overly optimistic in their efforts. The dive team for the state of Utah is just another example where local law enforcement took the position not to support the team, claiming that the various counties support each other. This makes a great sound bite, but in fact could not happen. The qualified people just do not exist among the agencies.

²² Sheriff Dale Stacey of Rich County Sheriffs Office. Discussion with the Commissioner of Public Safety. 2003

²³ Breckenridge, Dr. Jim Professor at Stanford University. NPS Class March 15, 2004

²⁴ Psychology Today – November 1971, NPS Curriculum

Rationale, is when a group attempts to justify a position, even though it goes against reasonable judgment. An example is the position of the Sheriffs' Association not to support the use of the state dive teams, investigative teams, or equipment, all the time knowing that they could not support each other even if they wanted to. Another example of rationale, is the use of state investigators by non state organizations. The Sheriff of Daggett County stated, "It would be a cold day in hell before I would ask you state investigators for anything in my county."²⁵ It is axiomatic that his investigators are not trained, and in many cases not qualified to handle complex criminal investigations in areas ranging from blood splatter to internet crime.

Morality in the context of groupthink is the attitude that we have a certain mission and the state should not interfere. It has been repeated by the President of the Sheriffs' Association that the state is trying to take over and the sheriffs need to band together to keep from losing their mission.²⁶ There have been many discussions among the Sheriffs' Associations about their fear of the state developing a state police force. When the president of the Sheriffs' Association was asked about this, his response was, "If the state takes over, sheriff departments will be regulated to serving papers (subpoenas) only."²⁷ This position and belief is common among the elected sheriffs in the state of Utah. There has been no discussion at the state level to take over services common to sheriff departments.

The holding of stereotyped views is common. This is evident in the terms often used by different groups, such as "local yokels, the feds, the state," each term used to separate one group from another, usually in a negative light. The stereotyped ideas of each level of government in regards to other levels have evolved over time. The term "local yokels" is offensive to most. As far away as Kentucky, when a group of local officials were asked about the term local yokels, they replied that the term connotes

²⁵ Sheriff Allen Campbell of Daggett County Sheriffs Office. Discussion with the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. 2003

²⁶ Sheriff Kirk Smith of Washington County Sheriffs Office. Confidential Discussion by telephone with the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. 2003

²⁷ Sheriff Brad Slater of Weber County Sheriffs Office. Comments made to the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. 2003

unsophisticated, untrustworthy, simple, and unimportant. Some of their own commented that when used by federal officials these terms are offensive.²⁸

The applying of peer pressure to any individual who expresses doubts about any of the group's shared illusions is common. An example again is the dive team, where one sheriff spoke up against the group's decision and received a brow beating. Recently, during a law enforcement leadership meeting in St. George, Utah, the issue of asking for state support was brought up. One chief spoke up on behalf of the state, and several other chiefs spoke out against the position and pressured the supportive chief to sit down. Incidents of this type are not uncommon in the areas of information sharing, combining investigations, or requesting state resources.²⁹

Groupthink stretches into all levels and disciplines in Utah. An example is when a group has political biases, such as in Kane County, Utah. Ongoing controversial issues, unrelated to homeland security, such as "road issues" and who owns roads on Federal land, causes the arguments to spill over into other areas. Different management styles develop that take on such human characteristics as a narcissistic personality. These leaders are vulnerable to biased information processing so they overestimate their own strength. They have paranoid personalities and feel surrounded by the enemies (state and federal). Thus, their world is dominated by suspicion and distrust. They are suspicious of the motives of others, believing they are going to be exploited, harmed or deceived. The individual personalities can develop into communities of belief. Communities of belief are scattered groups that share common values and philosophies regarding a social problem.

Some local leaders have spoken of being humiliated and, thus, angry. This history has had dramatic effects among the public safety organizations in Utah. However deep rooted and unspoken the resentment is, the negative factors must be acknowledged at each level. Strategies must be developed to address them or coming together (interoperability) will not occur. The experiences mentioned have created an environment in Utah of humiliation, resentment, anger, and ambivalence. These

²⁸ Homeland Security In Rural America Matters Conference. Breakout Session. Somerset, Kentucky. March 8, 2004.

²⁹ EDI, Executive Development Institute Conference. St. George, Utah. Meeting held Friday, March 26, 2004

powerful human emotions, when shared across enough organizations, create a “community of belief.”. This community of belief is extremely powerful when it controls resources and political environments.

Trust is the one factor that is mentioned most often as non-existent. As Sheriff Phillips pointed out, “No trust is the culture in Utah.”³⁰ There is little discussion on what trust is and how to build trust into a strategy. What has become clear is that not having dialogue on this critical characteristic is to build failure into the homeland security effort.

Trust must be defined, understood, and engrained in all education, policy, and leadership decisions. Stephen Robbins discusses the critical issue of trust in leadership. Robbins defines trust as a positive expectation of words, actions, or decisions. He further discusses trust as a highly dependent process based on relevant experiences. Unfortunately, in Utah, for the most part, the relevant experiences have been negative (if the feedback from the rural law-enforcement leaders is believed.)

Robbins further points out that trust takes time to form, builds incrementally, and accumulates. Most of us find it difficult to trust immediately. This simple fact is critical when one takes into account the swiftness with which homeland security is developing. Sheriff Ed Phillips of Millard County, Utah said, “Trust will be key and will take time.”³¹ This critical characteristic, Phillips so aptly points out, will take time. In Utah, the lack of trust has been created over time, and people have long memories. A Sheriff had a negative experience with the state SWAT team responding in his county on a drug case. Upon completion, the SWAT team left the equipment dirty and while in town their behavior was less than professional. When he contacted DPS leadership no one seemed to care, according to the Sheriff. The interesting fact about this incident is it happened five years ago and he is still repeating it. This is an indication of the power of bad experiences and how these negative feelings will affect the future if a dialogue is not open, honest, and solution oriented. To build trust we will need to disclose, give access and share. Opening systems and sharing databases or resources make organizations vulnerable to criticism and information leaks. An FBI agent reported the reason for the FBI’s historical nonsharing culture is that the FBI has been “burned so many times by

³⁰ Sheriff Edgar Phillips, Millard County Sheriffs Office. As stated in the Utah Department of Public Safety Survey. March, 2004.

³¹ Sheriff Edgar Phillips, Millard County Sheriffs Office. E-mail to Robert Flowers. February, 2004

sharing information, and no one is willing to put their career on the line to simply share information and take the risk of being burned.”³² Robbins also points out that trust may not necessarily mean taking the risk; rather it is a willingness to take the risk.³³ Organizations have not been willing to take the risks for many valid reasons, mainly fear of being “burned.”

Recent evidence, according to Robbins, breaks down trust in the following manner:³⁴

1. Integrity – being honest and truthful and discussing things
2. Competence – technical and interpersonal knowledge and developed skills
3. Consistency – reliability, predictability and good judgment
4. Loyalty – willingness to protect agreements

Using Robbins description of trust, Utah history is replete with examples where integrity, consistency, competence, and loyalty have been violated, ignored, or disregarded in the interactions of individuals and organizations. The cultural result of this history is the current environment characterized by a lack of respect and trust and unwillingness to work together in the critical information area of homeland security. When one breaks down trust in this fashion, a strategy can be developed to build trust among organizations. An example of positive intentions without communication, education and collaboration is the creation of the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center, UCIC.

To build trust in information sharing, the Utah Department of Public Safety created the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center (UCIC). The goal was to build trust and to break down the “stovepiping” that exists at the municipal, county, and state levels. The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and UCIC were created to cross jurisdictions for information sharing in regards to terrorism. The intentions of those creating these infrastructures were positive, but no consideration was given to the negative cultural environment and no strategy was made to gain the support of leadership throughout

³² FBI Agent Rick Palmer. Interviewed by Robert Flowers. January, 2004

³³ Robbins, Stephen P., “Organizational Behavior.” Tenth Edition. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2003. Page 336

³⁴ Robbins, Stephen P., “Organizational Behavior.” Tenth Edition. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2003. Page 336

public safety organizations in Utah. As a result, public safety agencies have been slow to support their infrastructures.

The problem is directly related to the fact that little collaboration, education or communication among the agencies was utilized. The result has been little collaboration, limited positive experiences, and no trust built. Another similar example is the failure of the Multi-State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) program previously mentioned.

The program is supported through the Department of Homeland Security, but the misunderstanding of systems has created a political environment of mistrust rather than the “trusted, decentralized network” the Markle Report indicates is necessary in this new homeland security environment. The controversy was created when the Utah Legislature learned of the MATRIX project through a fiscal note attached to the project. The negative reaction by elected officials to this program is an indication of the necessity to ensure collaboration to build trust. The reaction of the Utah Legislature was to basically shut down the project. This reaction is an indication of the volatility of the public interest issue and the critical importance of collaboration and education required to create an information network environment in Utah. This is also an example of not involving the major stakeholders in a collaborative fashion to build trust into the public issue and the results.

The Total Information Awareness (TIA) program is an example of the MATRIX problem that developed in Utah at a federal level. TIA was developed to manage information and to enhance the government’s ability to detect terrorist activity. The confusion and ambiguousness concerning TIA created such controversy that Congress eliminated all funding for the TIA program and “any successor program.” The Report makes an interesting point when it reads, “Had the government, in developing a TIA, formulated policy principles and guidelines on the search and use of technologies to access privately held data and engaged in a public discussion of those policies, it would not have become so mired in the controversy that resulted in the banning of research by Congress. This is another example of little or no communication, education or collaboration at the federal level.”³⁵ In Utah the impression of MATRIX was that it was

³⁵ Markle Foundation Task Force. “Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security. Second Report. New York City, NY. December 2003.

somehow a secret agreement by the Governor of Utah and others. It played out as a sinister operation. During a legislative hearing, Utah State Senator Patrice Arent commented that just the name MATRIX conjured up a negative impression.³⁶ In March, 2004 Governor Walker finally gave instructions to the Commissioner of Public Safety to stop Utah's participation in the MATRIX program. The TIA at the federal level and the MATRIX program at the state level are effective examples of cultural issues. These are further examples of the need to develop, inform, educate and collaborate in order to gain widespread support and trust for programs such as these.

The interesting point of this information sharing program was that the information was already available to law enforcement, the technology just made the information available faster. The three listed suggestions previously discussed in this paper were all aspects inquired into by the press, the Utah Legislature, and the public.

³⁶ Arent, Senator Patrice. Legislative Appropriation Committee Hearing. Utah State Capitol. February 12, 2004.

III. OVERCOMING CULTURAL BARRIERS TO CHANGE

Change does not just happen. You can wish for it and hope for it, but to be successful you must plan for it. Change is brought about by the actions of people, and requires thought and strategy. According to Dr. Bonger of Stanford University, “work on the worst first” then “prioritize the attack, as one strategizes change.”³⁷ To create a sense of urgency we must make it clear that “we all go down together” if success is not a result. This is the urgency part that has been discussed earlier. To begin the strategy, an acknowledgement of a process is important. Change will take time, depending on many factors. Those factors include how powerful people's beliefs are, how controversial one's own concepts are, and how effective the strategy is. You can't ignore that change is brought about by people. The strategy must begin and end with an understanding of basic human behavior. To ignore the people part of the equation dooms any necessary change to failure. People involved must go through a change process that is planned and well thought out. The change must also be introduced properly. There are many forces that work for or against change. A process to identify, study, and allow for these forces is a must.

A basic understanding of the culture of those affected by the change must be acknowledged. Cultural issues in Utah, such as parochialism, groupthink and trust, must be strategized for desired results. That strategy must include robust communication, meaningful collaboration, and effective education and training programs, all critical to developing strong human relationships. These changes will be enacted by people and will not just occur naturally. Author Ronald Sims writes, “It's important to think through people-related changes as fully as you would think through a change in technology or another area.”³⁸ Millions of dollars have been spent on technology and processes in Utah, but it is hard to find effort or resources dedicated to thinking through the people-related change requirements. The people part of this was never anticipated at the state

³⁷ Bonger, Bruce, Ph.D., ABPP, FAPM. Chair and Co-Director Calvin Professor of Psychology, Pacific Graduate School of Psychology. Consulting Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University. Conversation with R. Flowers. March 19, 2004.

³⁸ Sims, Ronald R. “Managing Organizational Behavior.” Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut, 2002. Page 335

level. This was a critical mistake. According to Sims, far too frequently, managers and their organizations fail to set aside the time necessary for analyzing changing conditions and attitudes and suddenly find themselves in the middle of severe complications. Managers must learn to anticipate the need for change.³⁹

In the Division of Emergency Services/Homeland Security for the State of Utah many meetings were held to discuss the spending of dollars, creation of regions, and the putting together of the state emergency plan. The challenges involving people and organizations were never discussed. The results have been resistance at best and undermining at worst among the involved agencies. According to Sims, whenever possible, the need to change with the times should be anticipated, and management should attempt to implement these changes before the crisis-state is reached. Otherwise, serious organizational behavior difficulties can result. This would also bear out the point that a strategy must be developed that takes into account the people part before a crisis. This is not occurring in Utah.

Most people hate any change that doesn't include concomitant financial rewards. This is certainly true of homeland security. The change in philosophy has been resisted at all levels and jurisdictions in Utah. Any change that has been discussed without federal dollars attached has been met with resistance in Utah. Sims points out the criticality of people; no matter how technically or administratively perfect a proposed change may be, people make or break it. "Our people resist change for many reasons. Resisting change does not necessarily mean that they will never accept it. Change may be resisted because it was introduced improperly."⁴⁰ Even the introduction of a new concept (especially as controversial as information sharing is) must be strategized for. The Utah Criminal Intelligence Center (UCIC) could be an example of a needed change that improper introduction made less effective. The center was created with no thought of or input from the customers and thus had little buy-in. However, as time has passed and people in public safety organizations have become familiar with UCIC, it has become more useful. This simple fact can be used as an example of an important process that can

³⁹ Sims, Ronald R. "Managing Organizational Behavior." Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut, 2002. Page 337

⁴⁰ Sims, Ronald R. "Managing Organizational Behavior." Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut, 2002. Page 338

be doomed to failure when not introduced effectively. The MATRIX program again can be used as an example of failure to contemplate the reaction by the organizations and people involved.

Understanding and managing organizational changes presents complex challenges with strong common feelings. Often the speed and complexity of change severely tests the capabilities of managers and employees to adapt rapidly, even in positive environments. However, when organizations fail to change, the costs of that failure may be quite high. Managers and employees must understand the nature of the change needed and the likely effects of alternative approaches to bring about that change. It is clear that a change in individual thought must happen in a post-911 environment. The speed in which that change must occur will bring with it substantial challenges. It is clear that in Utah these changes are not occurring quickly enough. To emphasize what Ronald Sims wrote, “The costs of failure may be quite high.”⁴¹ In terrorism, it could be the highest price of all, loss of life. The urgency of a needed change environment and a strategy cannot be over emphasized.

The first challenge is creating an environment with a sense of urgency to motivate the necessary changes. Efforts in this area have had minimal success in coordination and sharing of information due to the current environment of let’s wait and see. Success has been driven by federal grant dollars. Currently, in Utah, there is no sense of urgency to motivate a change from the current critical environment. John P. Kotter suggests in his article “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” “Not creating a sense of urgency is one of the major reasons change fails.” Without motivation, people won’t help and the effort goes nowhere. Kotter further writes, “By not establishing a great enough urgency a transformational environment will not occur.”⁴² The chief executive officer will be key to creating the sense of urgency. A former CEO of a large European company stated that a great motivation for change is to create the belief that the status quo is more dangerous than looking into the unknown. This is certainly true when dealing with terrorism. The status quo of information gathering, sharing, and

⁴¹ Sims, Ronald R. “Managing Organizational Behavior.” Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut, 2002. Page 326

⁴² Kotter, John P. HBR OnPoint Article Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. Feb 1, 2000

disseminating in Utah could be extremely dangerous. Understanding the motivation to change is critical to building a strategy that outlines concepts, procedures or tools to be used in this effort. Kurt Lewin's model suggests that every change requires individuals to go through the following steps:⁴³

1. Unfreezing
2. Changing or moving
3. Refreezing

Lewin discusses his concept of "unfreezing." At this beginning stage individuals recognize the need for change driven by the sense of urgency. The individual must see the status quo as less than ideal. The unfreezing in Utah would be changing the minds of those resistant to the homeland security collaboration of federal, state, and local government agencies. It is the changing of the attitudes of leadership. It does not matter which level one is discussing, the unfreezing of the thought process is appropriate from the highest level of decision making to the first responder. How to "unfreeze" the contemporary thought would be part of the education and training strategies developed. This unfreezing will require time, positive experiences, and a basic understanding of the importance of a collaborative environment. What is important is an understanding that the status quo may be less than ideal and maybe even deadly in the homeland security environment.

Once individuals recognize the need for change and have received the necessary training, they begin altering their behavior. This behavior results in a changing or moving environment. Once change begins, it must be continually monitored and reinforced by leadership. Further, once people change or move in, a strategy should be developed to maintain the desired behavior.

Refreezing is the final step in Lewin's three-step process. The new behavior becomes a part of the individual's moral behavior. Refreezing is simply a new way of thinking. This refreezing of the thought process will require training, education, and robust leadership. Refreezing is simply institutionalizing new approaches.

⁴³ Sims, Ronald R. "Managing Organizational Behavior." Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut, 2002. Page 348-349

Lewin's model indicates that for change efforts to be successful, the three-stage process must be completed. Successful change thus requires that old behaviors be discarded, new behaviors be introduced, and these new behaviors be institutionalized and rewarded. In Utah, those implementing change thus far at the state level have not understood that to institute change an understanding of the change process will be critical. Creation of strategies in the context of this lack of understanding of human behavior actually has had a negative impact on creating a collaborative homeland security environment. The new culture required did not evolve. Actually, the actions of those involved reinforced the historical negative cultural environment thriving in Utah. The new directions needed were simply ignored, or actually undermined by many of those involved in homeland security. It was easier to maintain and spend the dollars on "items" rather than think about what really needed to be addressed in the culture.

What has become clear is that traditional and historical cultural behaviors, both negative and positive, are evident in Utah, and a strategy is required to deal with cultural issues or the current efforts will not be effective. Stages of change must be acknowledged and a strategy built around that concept. Each level of government will go through the three stages regardless of what they are labeled or which expert's model is used. Each level will take time to change and time is the enemy of security in today's environment.

"Fully implementing the needed change for an interoperable homeland security direction will ultimately require the development of a strategy that encourages unified operations."⁴⁴ Unified operations in general do not exist in Utah. To contemplate a unified operation in the area of information sharing will require a strategy to change the current environment of distrust, parochialism, and groupthink so common in Utah. This strategy should include the concepts, procedures needed, and resources required to assist leaders. The strategy will require the creation of enforceable policy, developing of leadership, and effective training of first line responders. Understanding this enormous challenge of changing organizations wrapped in history and tradition will be critical. This is the "people part" that is being ignored. When taking the challenges as a whole, the processes of change may seem impossible given the resistance. However, if the

⁴⁴ Doyle, Michael E. and Stump, Lt. Commander Greg. Homeland Defense Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 9, 12/03

strategy is broken down into different levels, focusing on particular problems or challenges then helps create the changes required.

Change of this magnitude, at any level of government, will bring with it driving and restraining forces, as described in the force field analysis created by Kurt Lewin. According to Lewin, this model asserts that a person's behavior is the product of two opposing forces: one force pushes toward preserving the status quo, and another force pushes for change. When the two opposing forces are approximately equal, current behavior is maintained. For change to occur, one must increase forces for change, weaken the forces for status quo, or a combination of these actions. This is true both for the individual and the group.⁴⁵ This method is concise and brings focus to the problems. It is also flexible and allows for subjectivity.

For managers, the first step in conducting a force-field analysis is to develop a list of all the forces promoting change and all those resisting change, then determine which positive and which negative forces are the most powerful. The forces can be ranked in order of importance or by strength. To facilitate the change, leaders try to remove, or at least minimize, some of the forces acting against the change in order to tip the balance so that the forces furthering the change outweigh those hindering the change. Understanding Lewin's three steps of changing human behavior and combining force field methodology, a strategy can begin to develop.

The current cultural environment in Utah has evolved over decades. The current environment will restrain, undermine, and resist the changes necessary to create a collaborative information-sharing infrastructure so important to homeland security. Groupthink, parochialism, and distrust must be studied, strategized, and removed before the environment can improve. The absence of a strategy has made the current homeland security efforts inefficient and wasteful. There has not been much significant improvement in the flow of information so critical to homeland security. Not having an effective strategy to deal with cultural issues that hamper the sharing of information may be leaving the citizens of Utah dangerously vulnerable. Significant attention and effort must be focused on this in developing a strategy. However, powerful leadership must be created before a strategy can be developed. This may require a reorganization of the

⁴⁵ Sims, Ronald R. "Managing Organizational Behavior." Quorum Books, Westport, Connecticut. 2002. Page 348

current structure in Utah. Currently, the leadership role has been placed with the Department of Public Safety because the federal dollars are appropriated through this office. This is an effective way to deliver the dollars but not the most effective way to lead the entire effort. The current cultural environment where successes have been minimal would indicate a restructuring of leadership is needed. This change will build the collaboration necessary to all aspects of homeland security, in particular the information sharing aspects.

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IV. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

Three levels of leadership and responsibility must be created and implemented in an effort to address and solve the problems of groupthink, parochialism and lack of trust that have previously been identified. Each level has certain specific responsibilities that will direct this effort.

The pyramid on the following page illustrates the different levels of leadership in Utah. Discussion of the illustration provides recommendations on leadership separation among the various levels of government in Utah.

Restructuring the leadership of the homeland security environment must be a top priority of the Governor of Utah. The Governor would task the Utah Department of Public Safety to coordinate and develop a top level task force, modeling it after the Olympic command structure. This effort will create opportunities to share ideas and develop educational strategies related to homeland security. This has the potential to drive the collaborative environment that will foster consistency, develop interpersonal skills and create the willingness to support Utah's homeland security effort. The first level group will be led from the Lt. Governor's office. It would also include legislative, police and fire, agriculture and health, private enterprise, and any other appropriate discipline deemed necessary by the Lt. Governor's office. The leaders selected may participate at all levels if deemed necessary. These levels are not only responsible for the vision of the program but are also responsible for the impartation of that vision to the first responders. As Cohen detailed in *Effective Behavior in Organizations*, a high level steering committee or advisory group must be created when change is required in the goals of the organization to help overcome barriers or resistance.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Cohen AR, Fink S, Gadon H, Willits R. *Effective Behavior in Organizations*. Fifth Edition. Erwin, Boston, MA. 1992. Page 459




Figure 1. Levels of Leadership

Leadership will prove the key to this program. Sheriff Ed Phillips of Millard County, Utah put it succinctly in his response to the survey, “Leadership, my man, is everything.”⁴⁷ The top level will be led by the Governor and Lieutenant Governor’s Office. This policy group should be seen as the creators of the vision and must drive the homeland security environment statewide. Chief Rick Dinse of the Salt Lake City Police Department responded to the homeland security survey by stating, “There is a lot of evidence to suggest that political leadership has been left out of the process, yet they drive policy if/when the critical incident occurs. They need to be educated on the mission, the strategy and plans to accomplish the mission, directing the stakeholders and advocates.”⁴⁸ Using Chief Dinse’s statement, it would be logical to conclude that a critical disconnect between policy and operations occurs when political leadership is left out of the process. This creates an environment of noncommitment and distrust as is prevalent in Utah today. John Kotter, in his article, stated, “One of the beginning steps is to form a powerful guiding coalition when attempting to change or lead any effort.”⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Sheriff Edgar Phillips of Millard County, Utah. Response to survey mailed to Utah Sheriffs and Chiefs by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. March, 2004

⁴⁸ Chief Charles “Rick” Dinse of the Salt Lake City Police Department, Utah. Response to survey mailed to Utah Sheriffs and Chiefs by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. March, 2004

⁴⁹ Kotter, John P. Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. March-April, 1995. Page 103

Kotter described this step as assembling a group with enough power to lead the change effort and encouraging the group to work together as a team. This concept should be adopted at levels one and two of the strategy in Utah. Assembling leadership, starting at the Governor's office, would insure the group had enough power to lead the change.

Collaborative leadership in the beginning will be critical. Involving members early is the first priority of the strategy. One of the mistakes clearly made in Utah with the MATRIX program was to not involve the policy makers and policy implementers early enough. The major restraining factor from Utah leadership was not including them when deciding to share the state's data bases. A comment by a Utah Sheriff underscores the importance of successful collaboration. He indicated that without inclusion of the users in a policy decision, buy-in will not occur. Sheriff Aaron Kennard, sheriff of the most populous county in Utah, indicated that he has a hard time getting involved in something as sensitive as formal information sharing or homeland security efforts that require coordination, if he is not brought in early in the creation.⁵⁰ This has not been the historical way of doing business in Utah. The Utah Criminal Intelligence Center is an example of not involving the users early; thus, the infrastructure was created with no customers.

Leadership must draft a plan, strategize specific problems and communicate that information early in the process. The vision and strategy should be disseminated and continually reinforced at every opportunity. Chief Rick Dinse, Salt Lake City Police Department, in his survey feedback, wrote, "There doesn't seem to be a plan, and if there is one, it is not being communicated."⁵¹

The analysis of the current environment also indicates that a communication gap exists between the layers of the organizations involved in the homeland security effort. Kotter recognized the importance of creating and communicating a vision. He points out that it is just as important to communicate that vision as creating it. The vision would be

⁵⁰ Sheriff Aaron Kennard's comment to DPS Commissioner R. Flowers. Executive Meeting. January, 2004

⁵¹ Chief Charles "Rick" Dinse of the Salt Lake City Police Department, Utah. Response to survey mailed to Utah Sheriffs and Chiefs by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. March, 2004

created at the top level then communicated through formal and informal strategies to each level. It would be critical to use every resource possible to communicate the new vision and strategies.

Leadership should also crystallize the vision at appropriate government levels with contracts. The vision should become formalized with memorandums of understanding (MOUs) or any other mechanism that solidifies the vision. Chief Rick Dinse pointed out the need for MOUs. He wrote, “The need to have understanding between cities and counties must be collaborative and formal. The effort must involve all city departments. This formality clarifies who will come and what they will bring when help is needed. The state should also be a player in these documents statewide.”⁵²

Powerful leadership can commit resources and drive fiscal policy. Funding should be used to motivate the participants and to demonstrate the importance of this effort to the policy group. The use of fiscal policy can be a powerful motivator to drive the strategy compliance. A change in funding methods may be required to change the current priorities of the current effort. This could be done at the highest policy level. Resources must be committed to training and education and follow-up exercising of response plans. Currently in Utah this is being done by the creation of a homeland security curriculum that will be developed for all levels of government. The curriculum is being developed by experts in several fields and with the guidance of higher education institutions. By requiring first responders to participate in the education and training program, cultural issues such as groupthink, parochialism, and the lack of trust can be addressed statewide. This would be a major achievement in building the collaboration so necessary to the homeland security environment.

Leadership must manage the vision and build in accountability. Leadership watches to see if the policies and directions are being implemented. This should be done formally as well as informally. This can be achieved through formal or informal meetings where progress is evaluated through submitted reports. Leadership must listen to the feedback provided by the customers. This creates trust and consistency important

⁵² Chief Charles “Rick” Dinse of the Salt Lake City Police Department, Utah. Response to survey mailed to Utah Sheriffs and Chiefs by the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety. March, 2004

to the process. Police Chief Lynn Excell of the Hurricane Police Department stated, “It was great to be asked about our needs, and great to know we were being listened to.”⁵³ Listening should be done by holding quarterly meetings, private conversations, and any other available communication method. Another example of the benefit that comes from listening to feedback is noted from the comments of Weber County Sheriff Brad Slater. In an open meeting he acknowledged the fact that the survey went out and sheriffs were finally asked their opinion. Further, he reported it was important that the state “listens to the Sheriffs to get commitment.”⁵⁴

Once the feedback is received, it is critical to make any appropriate adjustments. This empowers those making the recommendation and demonstrates collaboration. Listening and acting also can have a dramatic effort on building trust into the effort. This creates a robust communication system and ensures buy-in by those requesting any changes. For example, a recommended change to a log in process to a communication program was provided but not acted on. This evolved into an adversary group forming (groupthink) and opting out of Utah’s ULEIN project. The result was a major set back to the information process designed by the state. The ULEIN example would have been avoided if the leadership of the ULEIN project would have listened to the users and acted upon their recommendations.

The ULEIN example demonstrates the problem arising from not making recommended changes to policy or implementing changes. P. Hersey, in his book *Management of Organizational Behavior, Utilizing Human Resources*, writes about the process of change and collaboration. He explains that the method utilized to introduce change or to motivate change is critical to gaining support. There are two methodologies; namely, participative change and directive change. Hersey explains them in the following way. Participative change is implemented when new knowledge is made available to the individual or group. At this level an effective strategy must be to involve the group directly in helping or formalizing the new methods for obtaining the goal. This is group participation. Participative change is appropriate at the higher levels of

⁵³ Chief Lynn Excell of Hurricane Police Department, Utah. Meeting with the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety during the EDI conference in St. George, Utah. Monday, March 22, 2004

⁵⁴ Sheriff Brad Slater of Weber County Sheriffs Office, Utah. Meeting with the Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety during the EDI conference in St. George, Utah. Friday, March 26, 2004

government, or command, or in group participation. The goal of participative change is to gain information, identify problems, find solutions, make adjustments, and finally gain buy-in. This environment is more appropriate after the policy has been discussed and implemented. This philosophy is directed more towards the first responder or field personnel, like operating procedures that direct behavior in organizations.⁵⁵

Most people tend to prefer participative change. However, effective change agents are identified as those who can adopt their strategies to the demands of the unique environment. The best strategy depends on the environment, and, in the case of homeland security, the policy/implementation will have a different strategy, given the organizational structure. For example, the high policy levels may require a more participative environment versus the first responder/law enforcement officer, where a more directive approach would be appropriate. First responders may be better served to take a more directed approach, much like the current environment in organizations. According to Hersey, the participative style tends to be more effective when introduced by leaders who have personal power; that is, they have reference, information, and expert power.⁵⁶ The directive style necessitates that a leader have significant positional power. This is an important issue when attempting to institute change among different levels and different jurisdictions in Utah. The strategy must take into account these different levels and, thus, different approaches. Each level has unique motivators and a one-style approach would be counterproductive. Many examples exist in Utah where the directive approach has not worked. These examples are provided for us in legislative actions, grant requirements, budget directives, and law. As the Utah leaders develop the strategy in detail, that strategy must include collaboration with powerful leadership. By not doing so, improvement of the current environment in Utah will not occur. As the leadership develops the collaborative environment necessary, the next process to implement is the analysis of the restraining and driving forces that currently exist in Utah. These are the cultural forces that will either drive or restrain the homeland security efforts. The various

⁵⁵ Hersey, P. and Blanchard, K.H. "Management of Organizational Behavior. Utilizing Human Resources." Fifth Edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1988. Page 333

⁵⁶ Hersey, P. and Blanchard, K.H. "Management of Organizational Behavior. Utilizing Human Resources." Fifth Edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1988. Page 335

leadership levels will discover common driving and restraining forces. They will also discover different forces that will require unique strategies. For example, the restraining forces of politics will be powerful at the top level but may be less of a factor among the first responders. Further, the change environment may be less participative and more directive at the first responder level. By not understanding these nuances, major obstacles to building this collaborative effort will develop.

The restraining and driving forces at the top level have begun to be identified in meetings, group discussions, and private conversations. The characteristics of trust, groupthink, and parochialism must be considered very strong based on the discussions surrounding these characteristics and should be of highest priority. The restraining and driving forces have been identified and are diagrammed below. Recommended strategies for each characteristic should be developed. A few suggested problem solving strategies are recommended in this thesis.




Figure 2. Restraining and Driving Forces Model for Level II

The second level will require the same powerful robust leadership. This factor was previously discussed early in this paper. The leadership provided in this effort will also determine the success or failure of this effort. The leadership of this group should be established in the Lt. Governor's office. This brings the power of the Governor's office to bear on this effort and will further indicate the importance of this effort to the rest of the state. Selecting key legislators will be critical to the effort to gain resources and possible changes in law. As previously discussed, it also provides critical oversight. This group may also include the Attorney General's office and representation of the Police Chiefs and elected Sheriffs.




Figure 3. Level II Leadership

Level two objectives must implement the policies created by Level one in order to develop methods and create infrastructure that will support the policies directed by Level one.

The participants of level two would be selected by the Lt. Governor's office with the input of the level one participants. The creation of a powerful robust leadership at this level is as important as the top levels. This group would be much like the members of the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. The Utah Olympic Public Safety Command was a board made up of different disciplines but with command experience and field expertise.

This level could be created by Executive Order and given statutory authority. For example, in 1998 the Utah Legislature created the statute that allows the Public Safety Command (UCA-53-12) to manage public safety and law enforcement planning and operations for the 2002 games. The 20 statutory members of the command include representatives from federal, state and local law enforcement, EMS, fire, emergency management, public works, public health, and the Utah National Guard. This board could do for homeland security in Utah what the Utah Public Safety Command did for the Olympics. It is recommended that the Governor of Utah create this type of board for homeland security. It would be the obligation of this level to promote the vision and in

some cases the strategy of level one. The same strategies developed by level one should be mirrored at level two. The strategies to build collaboration, communication, and trust should be of the highest priority at all levels. Strategies to address parochialism, groupthink, and the lack of trust should be embedded in level two as in level one.

It should be the first priority of level two to craft a plan and develop policy that supports the vision and goals set forth by level one. Part of this priority is to commit resources, create training/education goals and objectives, and to develop accountability measures so important to this effort. To get the much-needed input, a participative environment must be supported and maintained. As in level one, an environment of openness, confidences kept, and agreements honored is mandatory.

At this level there are several motivators for change. When the policy makers and leaders are convinced that a more modern approach would benefit citizens', and thus their, interest a major philosophy change may occur. An example of a new way of thinking was the change from a traditional reactive approach by law enforcement, where systems developed into stovepipes, to a community policing approach, where stovepipes were replaced by networked problem solving. This change of thought process will be required in leadership for homeland security to succeed. This change environment was driven by top level leaders and reinforced by the second level.

Leadership will be the key to influence organizations toward an effective homeland security environment that is interoperable and networked. Strong leadership will be necessary for optimal effectiveness. Just as author Stephen Robbins writes, "In today's dynamic world, we need leaders to challenge the status-quo and to create a vision of the future."⁵⁷ The metamorphosis of community-oriented policies could be used as an example of the scope of change that will be required for homeland security in Utah. The processes can be identified and strategized for.

The restraining and driving forces may mirror many of the same forces that were experienced by the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command. Those restraining and driving forces are outlined in the following diagram. Those forces listed are not all-inclusive but would be a good starting point to build a strategy at level two. Of course, it would be just as important for this group to develop its process to continually identify and strategize

⁵⁷ Robbins, Stephen P., "Essentials of Organizational Behavior." Third Edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

other restraining and driving forces. These forces will change given the complexity of the human environment. Identifying these forces must be done through formal and informal feedback, continual dialogue, surveys, and any other available means.

The restraining and driving forces for the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command are outlined below:




Figure 4. Restraining and Driving Forces of UOPSC

Note: These forces are based on the Chairman of the Public Safety Command. He based his opinions on experience and feedback from many of the members over time. These are only meant as a starting point for discussion for Levels 1 and 2.

The third level is the individual organization level. This level is made up of all the different public safety organizations spreading across jurisdictions, disciplines, and levels of government. The leadership of this level is the agency chief executive. The

federal leadership would be made up of those assigned to the geographic area of Utah. The strategy, starting with the top level, would be working through the second level to coordinate the homeland security strategy continuing to the third level. This type of collaboration is a new concept for Utah homeland security. Historically, the Department of Public Safety drives public safety efforts that require a statewide focus. The current environment in Utah is a result of that strategy. What has occurred historically is that recommendations or procedures were created by the officials at the state level then communicated through a variety of ways by those officials. The historical approaches created confusion and lack of support for the effort. This led to a state information infrastructure that was largely ignored. Another significant change would require agencies that do not generally work together to coordinate their homeland security efforts. For example, health departments, agriculture departments, and other public safety agencies will be required to share information and procedures. The collaboration of these many different disciplines will be driven by leadership. The overall strategy, which includes resource allocation, will be driven by levels one and two and acted upon at level three, which is the level of the first responder. The restraining and driving forces at level three will include those of level two. The restraining and driving forces of level three are no different than those routinely experienced when any department or organization attempts to make significant change within the boundaries of that organization. The responsibility of creating a strategy to deal with these forces will be left up to the chief executive of the particular organization. However, an education and training curriculum will be available to those chief executives to introduce and implement the homeland security concepts within Utah.

The strategy at the third level is focused on training and education. A strong training and education program, if developed with the historical cultural forces in Utah in mind, can be effective in developing trust, commitment, and collaboration among the public safety organizations in the state. Education and training are key to gaining the commitment, collaboration, and trust so important to this effort. The first responders are key to prevention, response, and mitigation of all critical incidents. It is the goal of this program to unfreeze the current thinking of first responders, motivate them to move in a desired direction, and institute new behaviors and a new way of thinking that is required

in the Utah homeland security environment. Without a highly trained and motivated first responder, the homeland security effort in Utah will not improve beyond the status quo. The current environment has proven less than sufficient to meet the new challenges of homeland security in Utah.

At the organizational level, policies, guidelines and training will be critical. The desired behavior of first responders needs to be guided by policy, driven by leadership, and motivated by training. The Utah Department of Public Safety has been tasked with the responsibility of creating a training program. This effort has already begun. A curriculum is being developed and is currently being evaluated by subject matter experts before being introduced to the first responder community. The Department of Public Safety has teamed up with Utah State University to develop and deliver this homeland security training and certification program. It is the goal of those developing the training that not only will expertise be developed, but that the curriculum address those cultural issues imbedded into the first responders that have proven to be counterproductive. The curriculum has been developed with that goal in mind.

The training developed for first responders and the state of Utah has been separated into levels of training. The training objective will not only enhance knowledge of the subject matter but also break down those cultural barriers that are embedded in the behavior of first responders. The objectives of the first level of the program are to create awareness of the importance of homeland security, to create an understanding of the various elements involved, provide a review of the inter-relationships of elements, to clarify the role the public can play in homeland security, and to create a better understanding of how this knowledge can contribute to the security and well-being of the nation. Emphasizing that awareness will result in empowerment of the general public so that they will be able to feel the need and responsibility for protection of their neighbors and community. This level is focused on the general public.

This level may be the most difficult, not only for leadership to build a strategy, but to build collaboration, communication systems, and trust, simply because of the sheer number of organizations. In Utah there are 29 counties with numerous police departments, fire departments, health and agriculture organizations. The strategy is to start the leadership of this effort in the Governor's office, being inclusive of many

different levels of governmental agencies and the private sector. In this way, we will gain support and credibility to motivate leadership at all levels to buy-in to the homeland security effort.

As with the previous two levels there are restraining and driving forces that come into play in creating an effective homeland security environment. Change of any kind is extremely difficult. Groupthink and parochialism live and thrive at this level. An example of the difficulty initiating cultural change in public safety organizations is a recent change in philosophy over the last ten years from a reactive philosophy of law-enforcement agencies to that of community policing. This philosophical change was brought about by many factors. Those factors include leadership, political pressure, education and training. Probably the most critical factor is the buy-in of the first responder. The processes of this philosophical change could be examined as an example of the changes that may be required for an effective homeland security environment.

As in community policing methodologies, an effective homeland security environment will require processes to change those cultural characteristics that now hamper the effort. For levels one and two, a primary focus is on leadership. The strategy is to influence leadership to support a collaborative, effective, trusted homeland security environment where prevention, response, and mitigation of events can take place. The critical aspect of this homeland security environment is that of an information gathering, sharing, and analyzing infrastructure necessary to create effective plans, guidelines and policies at the first responder level.

At the department or organizational level, what become critical are policies, guidelines, and training to affect the behavior of the first responders. The desired behavior of first responders needs to be motivated by policy, directed by leadership, and guided by training. The Utah Department of Public Safety should be tasked with the responsibility of creating a training program to provide the necessary training to first responders. This effort has begun in DPS. A curriculum has been developed and is currently being evaluated by subject matter experts before being introduced to the first responder community. The Department of Public Safety has teamed up with Utah State University to develop and deliver this homeland security training and certification program.

The third level will be directed at specialty certifications. Upon completing a specialty certification, the participant will be able to perform the specialty function to an exceptional level by demonstrating the knowledge and proficiency in a relevant exercise. The certified individual will also perform the specialty function at the local level in concert with others in the area who have expertise in different functions, thus creating a team of educated and trained professionals who can serve their communities in the event of an emergency or disaster. These individuals must have a working knowledge of other functions, their interrelationships, and how the teams can function at an enhanced level of performance. They will have the knowledge and networks necessary to recognize the need for expanding the support level beyond their own community, should that be necessary. They will also need a working knowledge of the incident management system and the emergency operations Center and of how these integrate.

The target audience will be individuals from a variety of disciplines, at both command and operational levels. They will include law enforcement, fire fighting, emergency services, health professionals, private entities, and other professionals who may be identified in the future. The subject matter of this certification will include:

1. intelligence, information sharing
2. investigation management
3. emergency planning
4. infrastructure analysis
5. health and medical subject matter
6. agriculture
7. risk analysis

The goal of creating subject matter certification is to build credibility into the training and education programs. This will also create a cadre of trained and certified professionals in the state of Utah.

The programs will include a necessary ongoing research component. This research component is essential to homeland security in Utah to ensure the right goals are in place. The objectives are to:

1. engage the scientific and technical community in Utah in this effort
2. evaluate and investigate previously studied design and results

3. create collaborative relationships with higher education
4. provide most current information relative to homeland security in Utah
5. provide the cutting edge technology, policies and procedures to policy makers at all levels of government and the private sector.

One of the main goals at all levels of this training and education effort must be the changing of the existing culture in Utah. This change will be as dramatic as what occurred among first responders when police agencies adopted the Community Policing Philosophy. This was a dramatic change in culture from a reactionary mindset to a collaborative problem solving method. This dramatic change required leadership, robust strategies and strong education and training programs. The new thinking required in the evolving homeland security environment for first responders must be developed by education programs supported by leadership. Without education and training the changes simply will not occur to the level required, or with the urgency needed to drive the change.

V. CONCLUSION

Culture in Utah has become an impediment to creating a collaborative environment among public safety agencies necessary for homeland security. The current culture has evolved for many reasons and has a long history. The culture is one of groupthink, parochialism, and little trust among public safety organizations. These characteristics have had a negative effect among public safety organizations in Utah, and if not strategize for will jeopardize the flow of information necessary to homeland security. Information is the lifeblood of prevention, detection, and mitigation planning.

Trust is the one factor mentioned most often by public safety officials in Utah. Trust reflects the willingness to commit to concepts based on a history of collaboration, communication, positive experiences, and consistency. These four aspects of trust must be re-enforced through a strategy that develops these important characteristics. The lack of these four critical elements among agencies in Utah has created an environment where homeland security efforts cannot move forward with the necessary urgency and commitment.

The current spending of dollars to buy equipment for first responders is important but may prove ineffective and wasteful without a strategy to address the cultural aspects of homeland security. Terms such as collaboration, communication, and interoperability all have a critical component; that component is the human aspect. This aspect has been ignored in Utah, and the current culture is a result of that. There is little history in Utah of long-term collaboration, trusted communication or consideration of interoperability for future needs. Generally, leadership communication among public safety organizations is reduced to meetings, collaboration is on a case-by-case basis, and there is little understanding/agreement of interoperability. Yet, these important human aspects are discussed everywhere in homeland security at all levels of government.

The one critical aspect of homeland security in Utah being ignored is human aspect. Leadership is haphazard, groupthink has thrived, parochialism has evolved, and the lack of trust among the disciplines and organizations is the order of the day. We must rebuild the culture in Utah where trust is widespread, collaboration is routine, and communication is robust. This is a departure from the way business has been done in

Utah. The rebuilding will start with creation of powerful leadership. This leadership must develop a collaborative strategy addressing the cultural issues proving to be impediments to the necessary homeland security environment. An education and training program must be developed and delivered to the first responders, both public and private. Absent powerful leadership, a robust human strategy, and an education program the current environment will only continue. This cannot be allowed to happen in Utah, given the need to win the war against terrorism.

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